

INFO TECH n. 02/2019

Dipartimento Tecnico – 15 Gennaio 2019

(english text at the bottom)

Cari Associati,

In questo numero vi inoltriamo due bollettini su posizioni IFALPA riguardanti tematiche di security e sicurezza volo.

Il primo bollettino riguarda una problematica legata all'Annesso 6 ICAO circa la protezione dell'accesso in cockpit quando per esigenze operative, la porta blindata deve essere aperta.

Secondo l'IFALPA devono essere elaborate delle "barriere secondarie" protettive che impediscano l'accesso indesiderato nel cockpit da parte di persone non autorizzate.

Queste ulteriori barriere, attualmente abbastanza diffuse solo di carattere operativo e procedurale, dovranno essere implementate con barriere fisiche da installare negli aeromobili in aggiunta alla porta blindata, da usare in concomitanza dell'apertura della porta. Sono in studio diverse soluzioni.

Il secondo bollettino riguarda invece un fatto conosciuto e spesso messo in atto in molti aeroporti: nel percorso tra aereo e Terminal i passeggeri sono autorizzati a camminare sul piazzale senza scorta e senza sorveglianza.

Questa situazione, oltre che contraria agli standard internazionali, rappresenta rischi inaccettabili per la security e la sicurezza.

L'annesso 17 dell'ICAO (capitolo 4) stabilisce chiaramente che "il movimento delle persone da e verso l'aeromobile deve essere sorvegliato" ed il piazzale è un'area ristretta che può essere utilizzata liberamente solo da personale aeroportuale addestrato e autorizzato.

Di conseguenza, è essenziale limitare e monitorare qualsiasi movimento di passeggeri, non solo per garantire la propria sicurezza ma anche per migliorare la security.

Buona lettura

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Per ogni osservazione o feedback è gradita un'email a: dt@anpac.it

English Version

Dear Members,

In this issue we attach two bulletins about IFALPA positions regarding security and safety issues.

The first bulletin concerns a problem which refers to ICAO Annex 6 regarding the protection of cockpit access when, for operational reasons, the cockpit door must be open.

According to the IFALPA, protective "secondary barriers" must be developed to prevent unwanted access to the cockpit by unauthorized persons.

These second barriers, currently implemented only as operational and procedural nature, must be implemented with physical barriers to be installed in the aircraft in addition to the reinforced door, used concurrently during the opening of the door. Several solutions are under study.

The second bulletin concerns a known fact and often put in place in many airports: passengers are allowed to walk on the ramp without escort and without surveillance from airplane to the terminal.

This situation, as well as contrary to international standards, also represents unacceptable risks for security and safety.

Annex ICAO 17 (chapter 4) clearly states that "the movement of people to and from the aircraft must be supervised" and the apron is a restricted area that can only be used by trained and authorized airport personnel.

Consequently, it is essential to limit and monitor any movement of passengers, not only to ensure their own safety but also for security reasons.

The bulletin lists numerous prescriptions and recommendations below.

Enjoy the reading

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Any comments or feedback is welcome by emailing us at: dt@anpac.it

Secondary Barriers

BACKGROUND

ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices concerning the security of the flight crew compartment are contained in Annex 6, Chapter 13. They include provisions for door design, monitoring capabilities, and locking procedures. IFALPA believes that these provisions alone do not provide a complete solution to the potential problem of unauthorized cockpit access.

SECONDARY BARRIERS

There are times when operational necessity requires that the flight deck door be opened in flight. That period, however slight, represents a vulnerability that should be addressed. Security culture, awareness, and consistent, effective adherence to rules and procedures are crucially important.

Further enhancement of flight deck door security is the fitting of a secondary barrier, i.e., a system and procedure with the ability to delay and effectively deter unauthorised persons from entering the flight deck during the time when the flight deck door is open.

POSITION

Security culture, awareness, and consistent, effective adherence to rules and procedures are crucially important.

IFALPA believes that a secondary barrier system should be fitted as a complement to reinforced cockpit doors.

When the fitting of a secondary barrier is not feasible, any other means of physically blocking unauthorized access to the flight deck, whenever the door is opened, should be used. Such means should only be implemented following an appropriate risk assessment.

In all cases, relevant training and standardized crew procedures are essential to ensure the intended benefits.

Unescorted Passengers on the Apron

BACKGROUND

IFALPA has been made aware that passengers are allowed to walk on the apron unescorted and unsupervised on their way between the aircraft and the terminal building at some airports. This situation not only contravenes international Standards but also presents unacceptable safety and security risks.

ICAO Annex 17 (Chapter 4) clearly states that *"the movement of persons to and from the aircraft shall be supervised"*. The apron is a restricted area which only trained and security-checked aerodrome personnel can normally enter in order to perform their duties. Consequently, it is essential to limit and monitor any movement of passengers in this area, not only to guarantee their own safety but also for security purposes, to prevent unauthorized access and identify possible intruders.

POSITION

Controlling the movement of persons entering and walking within the airside and security restricted areas of airports is an essential part of aviation security. IFALPA believes that air bridges or shuttles should be used at all times when embarking or disembarking passengers. When this is not possible and passengers are required to walk on the apron to or from the aircraft, procedures should be implemented to ensure that:

- the pathway is well-lit, marked or sign-posted, and the distance walked is kept to a minimum;
- the movement of passengers is quick and efficient, and every effort is made to avoid the possibility of a queue;
- all passengers embarking are separated from passengers disembarking;
- all passengers are escorted and supervised by airport staff wearing airport identification badges and high visibility equipment in accordance with national Regulations; and
- no passenger is allowed within the aircraft's restricted areas (engines, landing gear, etc.).

Additionally, there should be no possibility for passengers to mix with unscreened persons or approach perimeter fences or service vehicles that have access to both landside and airside areas, in order to prevent the introduction of restricted articles or substances into the aircraft cabin.